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No. 135 | August 21, 2014

A Judicial Cure for the Disease of Overcriminalization
Stephen F. Smith

Abstract

The dangers of “overcriminalization” are widely appreciated across
the political spectrum, but confusion remains as to its cause. Standard
critiques fault legislatures alone. The problem, however, is not simply
that too many criminal laws are on the books, but that they are poorly
defined in ways that give unwarranted sweep to the criminal law, raising the danger of punishment absent or in excess of moral blameworthiness. Instead of narrowing ambiguous criminal laws to more appropriate bounds, courts frequently expand them, even when this ratchets
up the punishment that offenders face, and fail to insist on proof of
sufficiently culpable states of mind to render the resulting punishment
just. By changing how they interpret criminal statutes, taking narrow
construction principles and state-of-mind requirements more seriously, courts can help to cure the overcriminalization disease.
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s issues of public policy go, few are as strange as overcriminalization. Once largely the subject only of academic complaint,
the problems associated with overcriminalization are now more
widely understood. Major think tanks,1 media outlets,2 civil libertarian groups,3 and legal professional associations4 have shined a
harsh light on the injustices that federal prosecutors have committed against people who had no reason to know their actions were
wrongful, much less illegal.
These are not isolated cases of abusive prosecution; they take
place from coast to coast and have ruined the lives and reputations
of people who were like other law-abiding citizens except for their
misfortune of having attracted the attention of an overzealous federal agent or prosecutor.5 From left and right of political center to
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Congress has created an average of 56 new crimes every year
since 2000, roughly the same
rate as in the two prior decades.
Federal judges have repeatedly
used ambiguous statutes as a basis
for creating new federal crimes
and have expanded the reach of
overlapping federal crimes to drive
up the punishment for comparatively minor federal crimes.
The rule of lenity requires a court
to construe ambiguous criminal
laws narrowly, in favor of the
defendant, not to show lenience
to lawbreakers, but to protect
important societal interests
against the many adverse consequences that the judicial expansion of crimes produces.
The state-of-mind, or mens
rea, requirements are vital to
preventing morally undeserved
punishment and guaranteeing
the fair warning necessary to
enable law-abiding citizens to
avoid committing crimes.
Although comprehensive legislative reform is ultimately needed
to reverse overcriminalization,
the reform effort can and should
take place in federal courtrooms
as well as in Congress.
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points in between, there is an impressive consensus
that overcriminalization gravely threatens the liberty of ordinary citizens.
Nevertheless, reports of overcriminalization’s
demise would be greatly exaggerated. Congress has
repeatedly held hearings on the subject, and members of both parties have criticized the present state
of affairs in which the law virtually “makes everyone
a felon.”6 Yet Congress has taken no action.
Even that bleak statement is too optimistic:
Congress, while at times professing concern over
the federalization of crime,7 has continued to pass
new federal criminal laws at a relentless pace. Con-

gress has created an average of 56 new crimes every
year since 2000, roughly the same rate of criminalization from the two prior decades.8 This is no
aberration. As Professor John Baker has noted, “for
the past 25 years, a period over which the growth of
the federal criminal law has come under increasing
scrutiny, Congress has been creating over 500 new
crimes per decade.”9
Much like the addict who repeatedly breaks
promises to quit, Congress cannot seem to kick the
overcriminalization habit. Some addicts eventually
seek help through third-party “interventions,” but
the federal courts, committed as they are to expan-

1.

For example, The Heritage Foundation has played a leading role in the overcriminalization debate, establishing the Overcriminalization Project
to educate lawmakers and citizens on the subject. See The Heritage Foundation, Legal Issues: Overcriminalization,
http://www.heritage.org/issues/legal/overcriminalization (last visited May 28, 2014). Heritage has also published a series of reports
documenting the problems associated with overcriminalization and proposing common-sense reforms. See, e.g., One Nation Under Arrest:
How Crazy Laws, Rogue Prosecutors, and Activist Judges Threaten Your Liberty (2d ed. 2013) (Paul Rosenzweig ed.); Brian Walsh &
Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law (2010).

2.

Major newspapers and magazines, including The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, have carried news and opinion pieces in recent
years on overcriminalization. See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Federal Crime List Grows, Threshold of Guilt Declines, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 27, 2011); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are Ensnared, Wall St. J. (July 23, 2011); Adam Liptak,
Right and Left Join Forces to Take on U.S. in Criminal Justice Cases, N.Y. Times, at A1 (Nov. 24, 2009). See also, e.g., Ed Feulner, “The Trial,” American
Style: Who Can Avoid Running Afoul of Overcriminalization? Wash. Times, at B3 (Aug. 13, 2013); Wendy Kaminer, When Everyone Is an Offender,
The Atlantic (Sept. 28, 2011); Rough Justice in America: Too Many Laws, Too Many Prisoners, The Economist (July 22, 2010).

3.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) includes overcriminalization reform as part of its Mass Incarceration project.

4.

The American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) have long been critical of
overcriminalization at the federal level. In 1998, an ABA task force issued a report decrying the steady expansion of federal criminal laws.
See American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law (1998). The ABA remains active in calling attention to the costs of
overcriminalization. See American Bar Association, Task Force on Overcriminalization, American bar Association,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/overcriminalization.html (last visited May 27, 2014). The NACDL has consistently
urged Congress to enact sweeping reforms to counteract the adverse effects of overcriminalization. See, e.g., Defining the Problem and Scope
of Over-Criminalization and Over-Federalization: Hearing Before the Over-Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th
Cong (2013) (testimony of Steven D. Benjamin, President, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).

5.

The Heritage Foundation has created what might be called an “Overcriminalization Hall of Shame,” a list of documented cases nationwide in
which federal prosecutors have convicted people who inadvertently ran afoul of obscure federal laws. See
http://www.heritage.org/issues/legal/overcriminalization. A sampling of these stories has been collected and published by members of an
Overcriminalization Working Group, comprised of Heritage, the ACLU, and other respected opponents of overcriminalization, in USA v. YOU:
The Flood of Criminal Laws Affecting Your Liberty.

6.

William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 511 (2001). This idea, previously known mainly to criminal law
“insiders,” captured the attention of the public with the publication of Harvey A. Silverglate’s widely publicized exposé, Three Felonies a Day:
How the Feds Target the Innocent (2009). As his title indicates, Silverglate’s thesis is that American criminal laws are so broadly and poorly
defined that ordinary, well-meaning citizens unwittingly commit multiple felonies on a daily basis and thus are exposed to indictment and
conviction at the whim of federal agents and prosecutors.

7.

In 2013 alone, for example, the Congressional Task Force on Overcriminalization held three different hearings addressing concerns about the
overly broad nature of federal criminal liability.

8.

See John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 26, at 5 (June 16, 2008).
The ABA’s Task Force on Federalization found that fully 40 percent of the thousands of federal criminal laws in force were enacted after 1970.
See American Bar Association, The Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998).

9.

Baker, supra note 8, at 2.
2
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sive views of congressional power to define crimes,10
will not nudge Congress even to curb its reliance on
overcriminalization, much less to quit cold turkey.
At this point, traditional critiques of overcriminalization hit a brick wall because overcriminalization is understood primarily in quantitative
terms: the notion that there are too many criminal
laws regulating too many activities. From this view,
reform efforts depend entirely on Congress, which
needs to narrow and repeal scores of federal criminal laws. Absent such legislative action, federal prosecutors will continue to have free rein to exploit the
vagaries of federal law to charge and convict whomever they wish, regardless of how innocuous the
accused’s behavior is.
Fortunately, there is another path to reform in
this area, one that does not depend on congressional action (or heroic self-restraint by federal
prosecutors). This path to reform is informed statutory interpretation in federal criminal cases. Legislative overuse and prosecutorial misuse of the
criminal sanction need not go unchecked, as many
judges seem to think. The courts themselves have an
important role in defining crimes, a role that takes
on even greater importance as Congress continues
to default on its obligation to restrict criminal liability and penalties to sensible bounds.
Courts flesh out—and, more often than not,
prescribe in the first instance—the state of mind
required for conviction. The state-of-mind, or mens
rea, requirements are of vital importance in preventing morally undeserved punishment and guaranteeing the fair warning necessary to enable law-abiding
citizens to avoid committing crimes. As important
as the role of defining the mental element of criminal liability is, however, it is not the judiciary’s only
role in this area. The courts also help to define criminal liability by interpreting ambiguous statutes,
determining the meaning of laws in which Congress
failed to make its intention entirely clear.
Once the important role of the federal judiciary
in defining criminal liability is understood, there
is greater cause for optimism about the prospect of

finally reining in overcriminalization. The effort to
persuade Congress to reverse course and exercise
greater restraint and care in the use of criminal
sanction is important and should continue. It is time,
however, to broaden the conversation to include the
one branch of the federal government—the judiciary—that is most likely to be receptive to long-standing complaints about overcriminalization. As we
continue to await legislative reform, it is high time
for courts to be part of the solution to overcriminalization instead of part of the problem.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The first
section seeks to reframe the typical discussion of
overcriminalization in terms of the deeper problems
stemming from the expansive body of federal criminal law. These problems, which stem fundamentally
from poor crime definition, are ones that the federal
courts helped to create and thus can remedy on their
own without action by Congress. Although comprehensive legislative reform is ultimately needed, the
reform effort can and should take place in federal
courtrooms as well as in the chambers of Congress.
The second and third sections discuss the ways
in which courts have worsened—and, by changing
interpretive strategies, can counter—the adverse
effects of overcriminalization through statutory
interpretation. It is not “restraint” for courts to
expand ambiguous federal criminal statutes and to
water down mens rea requirements. To the contrary,
it is “activism” and an abdication of the judiciary’s
historic responsibility to promote due process and
equal justice for all.
To be faithful to its role as a coequal branch of
government, the federal judiciary should not be
rubber stamps for the Department of Justice’s predictably expansive uses of federal criminal statutes.
The judiciary should instead counteract the personal, political, and other considerations that often
sway prosecutorial decision making with informed,
dispassionate judgment about the proper scope of
federal criminal laws in light of statutory text, legislative intent, and enduring principles of criminal
law. The sooner federal judges get the message, the

10. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 881 & n.2 (2005) (hereinafter Smith, Proportionality and
Federalization) (noting that constitutional law does not limit, and indeed facilitates, the federalization of crime). The main culprit here, of
course, is the Commerce Clause, which even after the so-called New Federalism of the Rehnquist Court allows Congress to regulate even
the most local of crimes. As Professor Lino Graglia laments, with the “narrow exception” of “clearly noneconomic conduct that is not part of
a larger regulatory scheme,” recent Commerce Clause cases “indicate[] a return to the Court’s practice since 1937 of reviewing purported
exercises of the commerce power in name only.” Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 761, 784–85 (2008).
3
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sooner overcriminalization’s days will be numbered
and the court system can resume the business of dispensing justice instead of merely punishment.

Overcriminalization Defined

As the term implies, critiques of overcriminalization posit that too many criminal laws are on the
books today and, relatedly, that existing criminal
prohibitions are too broad in scope. This standard
view of overcriminalization is quantitative in that it
bemoans the number of criminal laws on the books
and the amount of activity that is deemed criminal.
Arguments that there is too much criminal law
typically stress the fact that new criminal laws are
continuously added to the books, even when crime
rates are low or falling, and that the expansion
often involves “regulatory” offenses. Such offenses
punish conduct that is mala prohibita, or wrongful only because it is illegal, and may allow punishment where “consciousness of wrongdoing be totally
wanting.”11 With the continued proliferation of regulatory offenses, conduct that in prior generations
might have resulted only in civil fines or tort liability
(if that) is now subject to the stigma and punishment
of criminal law.12
Although the quantitative view tends to dominate discussions of overcriminalization, it is unsatisfying on its own terms. While such frequent use
of the criminal sanction, especially during election
years and times when crime rates are low or falling,
may suggest that Congress is legislating for reasons
other than legitimate public-safety needs, new criminal legislation might be used, for example, to signal

voters that its proponents are “tough” on crime.13
Alternatively, steady expansion in the reach of federal crimes might signify that Congress does not see
(or simply does not care much about) potential misuse of increasingly broad prosecutorial authority.14
Still, a broad, constantly expanding criminal
code need not jeopardize individual liberty or mete
out morally undeserved punishment. If the prohibitions and penalties are carefully tailored to appropriate offenses and offenders, a large, expanding
code can operate as justly as a code that is smaller
and more targeted in its reach. For this reason, the
quantitative objection to overcriminalization is,
without more, incomplete.
The quantitative objection implies a deeper,
qualitative objection to overcriminalization in that
overcriminalization tends to degrade the quality of
the criminal code, producing unjust outcomes. For
example, a code that is too large and grows too rapidly will often be poorly organized, structured, and
conceived. The crimes may not be readily accessible
or comprehensible to those who are subject to their
commands. Moreover, a sprawling, rapidly growing
criminal code likely contains inadequately defined
crimes—crimes, for example, in which the conduct
(actus reus) and state of mind (mens rea) elements
are incompletely fleshed out, giving unintended and
perhaps unwarranted sweep to those crimes.
The number and reach of criminal laws may be
symptomatic of a broken criminal justice system,
but the poor quality of the criminal code and the
resulting mismatch between moral culpability and
criminal liability are the disease.

11.

United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). As Dotterweich further explained, regulatory offenses employ criminal penalties as
a form of regulation to promote the effectiveness of health, safety, and welfare rules otherwise enforced through noncriminal means. See
id. at 280–81. Regulatory offenses differ from the types of crimes punishable at common law, which were deemed mala in se, or wrong in
themselves, and typically involved infringements of personal or property rights of others.

12.

The fact that regulatory offenses are punished criminally increases the number of federal criminal offenses immeasurably. Although 4,000
to 5,000 federal statutory provisions carry criminal penalties, the total number of federal criminal offenses is well in excess of 10,000 when
regulatory offenses are taken into account. As Professor Baker has explained, counting the many thousands of federal administrative rules and
regulations that can be enforced criminally would add “an additional 10,000 or so crimes” to the total. Baker, supra note 8.

13.

As the late Professor William Stuntz has explained: “Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals; politicians respond with tougher sentences
(overlapping crimes are one way to make sentences harsher) and more criminal prohibitions. This dynamic has been particularly powerful
the past two decades, as both major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime.’”
Stuntz, supra note 6, at 509. Although he credits tough-on-crime politics as an important factor in overcriminalization, his larger point is that
deeper forces of institutional cooperation drive legislators repeatedly to expand criminal liability and penalties because those actions benefit
prosecutors, who are legislators’ natural allies on issues of criminal justice. See id. at 509–11.

14. In other words, Congress might take what Paul Larkin refers to as a “trust us” approach to criminal lawmaking. As he explains: “The ‘trust us’
argument is that the law should be willing to allow overbreadth in criminal statutes because the courts and the public can rely, as Justices
Holmes and Frankfurter once noted, on the ‘conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers.’” Paul Larkin, The Dangers of a “Trust Us”
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum No. 93, at 2 (June 12, 2013).
4
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Overcriminalization as a (Partially)
Self-Inflicted Judicial Wound

Once overcriminalization’s qualitative aspects
are understood, it becomes evident that the blame
for overcriminalization cannot be laid entirely at
Congress’s doorstep. Regrettably, the courts have
played the overcriminalization game with Congress and the Department of Justice. They have
done so by expansively interpreting ambiguous
criminal statutes in derogation of the venerable
“rule of lenity” and by not insisting on mens rea
requirements robust enough to rule out morally
undeserved punishment. Both of these interpretive failures have made federal criminal law even
broader and more punitive.
Expansive Interpretations as Judicial Crime
Creation. It is often said that courts do not “create”
federal crimes, but that simply is not the case. When
courts expand the reach of ambiguous criminal laws
(laws which, by definition, can reasonably be read
to include or exclude the defendant’s conduct), they
are essentially creating crimes. They are determining for themselves, within the broad bounds of the
terms of an ambiguous statute, whether the defendant’s conduct should be condemned as criminal,
and they are doing so after the fact, without prior
warning to the defendant charged with a violation.
To allow citizens to be convicted and imprisoned
based on such judicial determinations transforms
federal criminal law into what one scholar has
described as “a species of federal common law”15—
a result fundamentally at odds with the principle
that in a democracy, the criminalization decision is
reserved for legislatures.16
The root of the problem is that the courts are
notoriously inconsistent in adhering to the rule of
lenity. The rule of lenity requires a court to construe

15.

ambiguous criminal laws narrowly, in favor of the
defendant,17 not to show lenience to lawbreakers,
but to protect important societal interests against
the many adverse consequences that the judicial
expansion of crimes produces. These consequences
include judicial usurpation of the legislative crimedefinition function, not to mention potential frustration of legislative purpose and unfair surprise to
persons convicted under vague statutes. The rule of
lenity therefore reflects, as Judge Henry Friendly
memorably said, a democratic society’s “instinctive
distaste against men languishing in prison unless
the lawmaker has clearly said they should.”18
More to the point, faithful adherence to the rule
of lenity would require courts to counteract overcriminalization. The rule would require courts to
narrow the scope of ambiguous criminal laws, adopting expansive interpretations only if compelled by
the statutory text. This would prevent prosecutors
from exploiting the ambiguities of poorly defined
federal crimes either to criminalize conduct that
Congress has not specifically declared to be a crime
or to redefine—or ratchet up the penalty for—crimes
dealt with more specifically in other statutes. The
rule of lenity would thus make poor crime definition
an obstacle to—not a license for—more expansive
applications of federal criminal law, remitting prosecutors seeking more enforcement authority to the
democratic process, not an unelected, unaccountable judiciary.
Regrettably, the federal courts treat the rule of
lenity with suspicion and, at times, outright hostility.
While sometimes faithfully applying the rule of lenity, the Supreme Court has frequently either ignored
lenity or dismissed it as a principle that applies only
when legislative history and other interpretive principles cannot give meaning to an ambiguous stat-

Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 347.

16. This notion inheres in the “principle of legality.” Although legality is sometimes described as merely a rejection of judicial crime creation vel
non, the principle reflects the broader notion that only legislatures are “politically competent to define crime.” John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality,
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 190 (1985).
17.

See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 US 336, 349 (1971).

18. Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks 196, 209 (Chicago,
1967)). The rule also has an important, albeit underappreciated, role in preventing courts from overriding legislative grading decisions. In
a system with many overlapping criminal laws, broad interpretations of statutes can increase the penalties the legislature provided in laws
specifically regulating a criminal act, potentially resulting in disproportionately severe punishment. See generally Smith, Proportionality and
Federalization, supra note 10, at 934–44.
5
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ute.19 Indeed, the federal courts disregard the rule of
lenity so frequently that it is questionable whether
the rule of lenity can still be accurately described as
a rule. As I have previously stated:
[T]he courts’ aversion to letting blameworthy
conduct slip through the federal cracks has dramatically reversed the lenity presumption. The
operative presumption in criminal cases today
is that whenever the conduct in question is morally blameworthy, statutes should be broadly
construed, in favor of the prosecution, unless the
defendant’s interpretation is compelled by the
statute…. The rule of lenity, in short, has been
converted from a rule about the proper locus of
lawmaking power in the area of crime into what
can only be described as a “rule of severity.”20

The results of the judiciary’s haphazard adherence to the rule of lenity are as predictable as

they are misguided. Federal judges have repeatedly used ambiguous statutes as a basis for creating new federal crimes.21 They have also expanded
the reach of overlapping federal crimes to drive up
the punishment that Congress prescribed for comparatively minor federal crimes.22 The end result of
such assaults on the rule of lenity is necessarily a
broader and more punitive federal criminal law—a
worsening of overcriminalization rather than
an improvement.
Inadequate Mens Rea Requirements. The
courts have done better—but only slightly—in fleshing out the state-of-mind, or mens rea, requirements
for federal criminal liability. As the Supreme Court
explained in Morissette v. United States,23 the concept
of punishment based on acts alone without a culpable state of mind is “inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law.” In our system, crime is understood as a “compound concept,” requiring both an
“evil-doing hand” and an “evil-meaning mind.”24

19. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), exemplifies the dismissive treatment lenity usually receives in federal court. Faced with
a statutory term that even the majority admitted had literally dozens of different dictionary meanings and no evidence of the meaning
that Congress intended, the majority simply chose the one it preferred and in doing so brought the defendant under a strict and otherwise
inapplicable mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg correctly saw an easy case for the rule of
lenity, the majority dismissed the rule as irrelevant. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote: “The rule of lenity applies only if, after seizing everything
from which aid can be derived…we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. To invoke the rule, we must conclude that
there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Id. at 138–39 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court’s schizophrenic case law on lenity, see Kahan, supra note 15, at 384–89.
20. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 926.
21.

See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 896–908 (discussing examples). One notorious example is mail and
wire fraud. Courts have cut the concept of “fraud” loose from its moorings in common-law notions of “fraud” and allowed prosecutors to
substitute in its place all sorts of imaginative “intangible rights.” Beginning with bribery and kickbacks involving corrupt public officials and
corporate self-dealing, the intangible-rights doctrine was steadily extended over decades to allow federal prosecution of a stunning array
of misbehavior. This misbehavior involved breaches of contract, conflicts of interest, ethical lapses, and violations of workplace rules that
otherwise would not be federal crimes and in some cases may not have been crimes at all. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime:
Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117 (1981). This
area was wide open to federal prosecutors until the recent decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010), in which the Court
invalidated the statute codifying the intangible-rights doctrine (18 U.S.C. § 1346) as void for vagueness as applied to wrongdoing other than
bribery and kickbacks.

22. An example is extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), the Court expanded the
concept of “extortion” to include the passive acceptance of bribes and gratuities by public officials. The result was a dramatic increase in the
maximum punishment available under other federal statutes regulating bribery and gratuities offenses. The maximum punishment for bribery
and gratuities qua extortion is 20 years, far in excess of the then-applicable maximum for “honest services” mail fraud (five years, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (1992)) and the applicable maximums under the federal program bribery statute (10 years, see 18 U.S.C. § 666) and the federal bribery
statute (15 years for bribery and two years for gratuities, see 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c)). See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization,
supra note 10, at 908–30 (discussing situations in which courts expanded overlapping crimes in ways that increased the penalty available
under other statutes).
23. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
24. Id. at 251. Notice that, Morissette’s colorful reference to the “evil-doing hand” notwithstanding, the actus reus often is innocuous conduct. For
example, the actus reus of mail fraud is simply using the mails, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the actus reus under the Travel Act includes interstate
or international travel, see U.S.C. § 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a). The blameworthiness of such crimes comes entirely from mens rea—in the examples
just given, the illicit purpose for which the mails or channels of commerce are used. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (intent to defraud); id. § 1952(a)
(intent to commit crimes).
6
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The historic role of the mens rea requirement is to
exempt from punishment those who are not “blameworthy in mind” and thereby to limit punishment to
persons who disregarded notice that their conduct
was wrong.25 Mens rea also serves to achieve proportionality of punishment for blameworthy acts,
ensuring that the punishment the law allows “fits”
the crime committed by the accused. Mens rea, for
example, guarantees that the harsher penalties for
intentional homicides will not be applied to accidental homicides.26
Despite the critical importance of mens rea to
the effectiveness and legitimacy of federal criminal
law, federal crimes often lack sufficient mens rea elements. Many federal crimes, including serious crimes,
contain no express mens rea requirements.27 Perhaps
more commonly, federal crimes include express mens
rea requirements for some element of the crime but
are silent as to the mens rea (if any) required for the
other elements.28 Here it is evident that Congress
intended to require mens rea but unclear whether
Congress intended the express mens rea requirement

to exclude additional mens rea requirements. In still
other situations, even when Congress includes mens
rea terms in the definition of crimes, it uses terms
such as “willfully” and “maliciously” that have no
intrinsic meaning and whose meaning varies widely
in different statutory contexts.29
This confusing state of affairs might be acceptable if the courts employed a consistent method of
mens rea selection. However, the courts have been
inconsistent in their approach to mens rea questions. On occasion, the Supreme Court stands ready
to read mens rea requirements into statutes that are
silent in whole or in part as to mens rea because the
Court has an interest in making a morally culpable
state of mind a prerequisite to punishment.30 This,
however, is not invariably so.
Sometimes, courts treat legislative silence concerning mens rea as a legislative signal to dispense
with traditional mens rea requirements, especially
with respect to regulatory crimes protecting the
public health, safety, and welfare. Even Morissette v.
United States, with its strong emphasis on the usual

25. 342 U.S. at 252.
26. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 133–35 (2009) (hereinafter Smith, Proportional Mens Rea). As a
consequence, the role of mens rea “is broader than exempting morally blameless conduct from punishment. It involves limiting guilt and
punishment in accordance with the blameworthiness of the defendant’s act. The means of doing so differs. In some cases, mens rea serves to
carve morally innocent conduct out of the reach of a criminal statute whereas, in others, it ensures that morally blameworthy conduct will not
be punished out of proportion with its level of blameworthiness; in still others, it does both. The goal, however, is the same: to ensure that guilt
and punishment track the moral blameworthiness of the conduct that gives rise to liability.” Id. at 136.
27. To give but two examples, the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), construed in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), makes it a
serious felony to possess unregistered grenades and other “firearms” but contains no express mens rea requirements. Similarly, the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), makes it a crime to commit extortion, defined as obtaining money or property from another, with his consent, through the
wrongful use of coercion, id. § 1951(b)(2). No mens rea requirements appear in the definition of the crime.
28. The false statement statute, for example, requires that the false statement have been made “knowingly and willfully” but provides no mens rea
requirement for the part of the crime requiring that the false statement have been made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Similarly, the federal child-pornography law requires that the defendant “knowingly” transported or received a visual
depiction but prescribes no mens rea either for the sexually explicit nature of the visual depiction or for the fact that it involved minors. See 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a).
29. According to the Brown Commission, known more formally as the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, federal criminal
statutes contain a “staggering array” of mens rea terms, and “there is no discernible pattern or consistent rationale which explains why one
crime is defined or understood to require one mental state and another crime another mental state or indeed no mental state at all.”
1 National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 119–20 (1970). For example, “willfulness” has a chameleonlike quality in federal criminal law: “The word ‘willfully’ is sometimes said to be ‘a word of many meanings’ whose construction is often
dependent on the context in which it appears. Most obviously it differentiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct, but in the criminal
law…a ‘willful’ act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (citations omitted).
30. A good example is Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). In that case, the defendant was convicted for possession of an unregistered
machine gun despite his claimed ignorance of his rifle’s ability to fire automatically. To the prosecution, all that mattered was that he knew
his rifle was a gun. The Court disagreed. In our gun-friendly culture in which handguns and long guns are lawful possessions in millions of
households, mere knowledge that one is in possession of a firearm fails to give notice of a potential criminal violation. In order for the requisite
culpable mental state to exist, the Court ruled, the government must prove the defendant knew the specific characteristic of his gun (in
Staples, its automatic-firing capability) that placed it in the category of “quasi-suspect” weapons as to which citizens can reasonably expect
legal regulation.
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requirement that a culpable mental state is a prerequisite to punishment, conceded that the requirement may not apply to regulatory or other crimes not
derived from the common law.31 The Court seized on
this statement in United States v. Freed32 as justification for treating a felony punishable by 10 years in
prison as a regulatory offense requiring no morally
culpable mental state.
To be sure, more recent cases cast doubt on Morissette and Freed in this respect. Among these cases
are Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,33 Ratzlaf
v. United States,34 and Staples v. United States.35 In
each case, the Supreme Court adopted heightened
mens rea requirements, and Arthur Andersen and
Ratzlaf went so far as to make ignorance of the law
a defense.36 Each time, the Court ratcheted up mens
rea requirements for the stated purpose of preventing conviction for morally blameless conduct.
These cases, I believe, are best read as making a
culpable mental state a prerequisite for punishment
for all crimes, even regulatory offenses. As I have
explained elsewhere:
[T]he Supreme Court has dramatically revitalized the mens rea requirement for federal crimes.
The “guilty mind” requirement now aspires to
exempt all “innocent” (or morally blameless)
conduct from punishment and restrict criminal
statutes to conduct that is “inevitably nefarious.”

When a literal interpretation of a federal criminal statute could encompass “innocent” behavior,
courts stand ready to impose heightened mens rea
requirements designed to exempt all such behavior from punishment. The goal of current federal
mens rea doctrine, in other words, is nothing short
of protecting moral innocence against the stigma
and penalties of criminal punishment.37

The fact remains, however, that Freed and cases
like it have never been overturned. Unless that happens, confusion will persist, as will the possibility
that a culpable mental state may not be required for
some crimes, especially regulatory offenses involving health and safety concerns.
One thing, however, is certain: As long as courts
fail to make proof of a culpable mental state an
unyielding prerequisite to punishment, federal
prosecutors will continue to water down mens rea
requirements in ways that allow conviction in excess
of blameworthiness. That is exactly what prosecutors did in Arthur Andersen during the wave of postEnron hysteria over corporate fraud. In seeking to
convict Enron’s accounting firm of the “corrupt persuasion” form of obstruction of justice, prosecutors—
flatly disregarding the lesson of cases like Staples
and Ratzlaf—argued for incredibly weak mens rea
requirements that, as the Court noted, would have
criminalized entirely innocuous conduct.38

31. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). As unfortunate as Morissette’s dictum was in this respect, the Court had previously
held that the category of regulatory offenses that Morissette later referred to as “public welfare offenses” “dispenses with the conventional
requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added).
32. 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (noting that common-law crimes belong to a “different category” than the “expanding regulatory area involving
activities affecting public health, safety, and welfare” as to which relaxed mens rea requirements apply).
33. 544 U.S. 696 (2000).
34. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
35. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
36. Arthur Andersen held that ordering the destruction of documents to keep them out of the hands of federal investigators cannot be considered
“knowing corruption” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) unless the person who gave the order knew he was acting illegally. See Arthur
Andersen, 544 U.S. at 706. Staples, as previously explained, ruled that a person does not knowingly possess an unregistered “firearm” unless
he knew the precise characteristics of the weapon that classified it as a “firearm” subject to federal registration requirements. See supra
note 30. Ratzlaf held that to be guilty of “willfully” violating a prohibition of evading currency transaction reporting requirements by breaking
down a cash transaction in excess of $10,000 into smaller transactions, the prosecution must prove the accused knew that such “structuring”
activity is illegal. See Ratlzaf, 510 U.S. at 149.
37. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 127 (footnotes omitted); see generally John S. Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness:
Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021 (1999).
38. The government’s interpretation would have made it a crime either to withhold documents from federal investigators or to destroy documents
pursuant to the sort of document-retention policies that are commonplace in the business world, even if the person responsible for
nondisclosure or destruction honestly believed he was acting lawfully and even if the person was reasonably unaware that the documents
pertained to a federal investigation. See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705–08.
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Although the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the Justice Department’s efforts and overturned Arthur Andersen’s conviction, the firm has
less cause to celebrate than one might think. After
being convicted on a prosecution theory so aggressive that it could not win even a single vote from the
Justices, the firm—once a Big Five accounting firm—
went out of the consulting business. Even now that
it no longer stands convicted of a crime, its reputation has likely been damaged beyond repair. Its own
conduct in the Enron matter had a lot to do with that,
of course, but so did the overzealousness of federal
prosecutors in exploiting the serious imperfections
in federal mens rea doctrine. The Arthur Andersen
episode simultaneously shows the need for substantial mens rea reform and the high cost of not having
strong mens rea requirements.

The Judicial Path to
Overcriminalization Reform

Given that overcriminalization has qualitative
components—for which courts themselves bear a
large share of the blame—courts can be part of the
solution instead of part of the problem. Even if Congress and federal prosecutors continue their unrestrained use of the criminal sanction, courts are not
powerless to act.
The solution is for courts to interpret statutes in
ways that rectify the qualitative defects that overcriminalization produces in a body of criminal law
as sprawling and poorly defined as federal criminal law is. New interpretive strategies, tailored to
the troubling realities of a criminal justice system
characterized by rampant overcriminalization,
can help to right this fundamental wrong in federal
criminal law.39

Statutory construction, of course, has its limits
and cannot be used to defeat the operation of statutes that plainly encompass the defendant’s conduct.
In cases such as these, courts should apply the statutes as written, barring some constitutional infirmity, but even here courts can exercise informed
discretion to counteract abusive exercises of prosecutorial discretion.
After United States v. Booker,40 district judges have
wide sentencing discretion, and they can and should
use that discretion to show suitable lenience toward
sympathetic defendants. The President can also use
his power to grant pardons or commute sentences—
as President Barack Obama recently did to free eight
prisoners serving unduly long drug sentences in the
wake of the Fair Sentencing Act of 201041—to do justice toward defendants who were unfairly convicted
or sentenced.42 Although these important safeguards
for the sound administration of criminal justice
should not be overlooked, this paper focuses on how
courts can interpret criminal statutes to counteract
the effects of overcriminalization.
Restoring the Rule of Lenity to Its Rightful
Place. In light of how often courts interpret criminal statutes expansively, it should be clear that they
do not simply let the weights in the interpretive
scales determine whether statutes are to be read
broadly or narrowly, as academic critics of lenity
would have them do.43 Instead, the balance is heavily skewed in favor of the prosecution when the conduct in question is morally blameworthy, even when
a broad interpretation allows prosecutors to drive
up considerably the punishment that would otherwise apply or to evade limitations that the legislature included in the definition of the crime in more
specific statutes.

39. For a more detailed discussion of these and other potential judicial reform measures, see Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 537, 578–89 (2012).
40. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
41.

See David Jackson, Obama Commutes 8 Crack Cocaine Sentences, USA Today (Dec. 19, 2013). The grant of executive clemency, unusual for
the Obama Administration, came a year after stunning press reports and calls for investigations concerning misconduct in the Office of the
Pardon Attorney resulting in critical evidence supporting clemency being withheld from the White House. See, e.g., Dafna Linzer, Pardon
Attorney Torpedoes Plea for Presidential Mercy, ProPublica (May 30, 2012). (In the interest of full disclosure, the author signed a joint letter of
criminal law and procedure professors calling for an investigation into the Office of the Pardon Attorney.)

42. See Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 593 (2012). For a similar argument in the
context of capital offenses, see Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 Va. L. Rev. 283, 319–27 (2008).
43. See Kahan, supra note 15, at 425; Jeffries, supra note 16, at 189.
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Whether the law enforcement need for expanded
authority is real,44 minimal,45 or just silly,46 the one
constant seems to be that courts will go to almost
any lengths to keep blameworthy conduct from slipping through the federal cracks. Thus, it is closer to
the truth to say that the operative interpretive rule
in federal criminal cases is severity: that ambiguous
statutes presumptively should be construed broadly to prevent culpable defendants from slipping
through the federal cracks.
In practice, then, rejecting the rule of lenity tends
to look a lot like endorsing anti-lenity (or a rule of
severity). That, in turn, affords a substantial justification for taking lenity seriously, even if, as a theoretical matter, an evenhanded approach to the interpretation of criminal statutes might be preferable to
a strict-construction default. After all, even critics
of lenity do not contend that criminal laws should
always be interpreted broadly, recognizing that
sometimes courts should narrow the reach of criminal statutes.47
The obvious assumption is that there is a viable
interpretive middle ground between the lenity side
of the spectrum (in which ambiguous statutes are
always construed narrowly) and the anti-lenity or
severity side of the spectrum (in which such statutes are always construed broadly). This assump-

tion is quite difficult to reconcile with the courts’
rather checkered track record in interpreting federal crimes.48 Given that courts often miss valid reasons for narrowly construing statutes, a consistently
applied rule of lenity under which every ambiguous
criminal statute is read narrowly is the right interpretive rule.
The political economy of criminal law confirms
that lenity is the right interpretive default. The relevant question is which interpretive rule would give
Congress proper incentives to make its intentions
clear concerning the scope and meaning of criminal statutes. To the extent that legislatures generally share prosecutors’ desire for broad criminal
prohibitions,49 a rigidly enforced rule of lenity would
operate as an information-forcing default rule, giving Congress added incentives to make its wishes
known ex ante.
Additionally, once an ambiguity arises in particular settings, as it often does, the question is whether
the Department of Justice or groups favoring criminal justice reform are in the best position to convince
Congress to pass new legislation resolving the interpretive question. The Justice Department—the 800pound gorilla in federal criminal law—is undoubtedly best suited to the task of overcoming legislative
inertia. As Professor Einer Elhauge explains, “there

44. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (allowing the federal racketeering statute to be used against corrupt “enterprises”
without any effort by racketeers to infiltrate legitimate businesses); see generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at
909–11 (discussing implications of Turkette for federal efforts to eradicate organized crime).
45. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), is a case in point. There the defendant sought to trade a machine gun for drugs. He was convicted
of multiple drug offenses and presumably could have been convicted of any number of serious firearms offenses as well. Suffice it to say
that there was no danger that he or others who purchase drugs with guns (much less machine guns) would slip through the federal cracks.
The prosecutor, however, argued that exchanging guns for drugs constitutes “use…of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
offense” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). One would think that such barter is not a terribly significant problem: Even if trading guns for
drugs is common (which is far from self-evident), it would surely be the rare drug dealer whose access to firearms depends on bartering
customers. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the ordinary meaning of “using a gun” (which connotes employment as a weapon) and endorsed
the “universal view of the courts of appeals” that the statute encompasses barter with as well as more lethal “uses” of guns. 508 U.S. at
233. That the Court stretched the statute to convict is all the more remarkable given the draconian penal consequences of its interpretation:
Having bartered with a machine gun, Smith faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years, to run consecutively with his underlying drug
convictions. See id. at 227.
46. In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), the Court watered down the mens rea required to convict under the federal bank robbery
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113, to “permit the statute to reach cases…where an ex-convict robs a bank [without any intent to abscond with the
loot] because he wants to be apprehended and returned to prison.” Id. at 271. The reader will be forgiven for regarding this as a solution in
desperate search of a problem.
47. For example, Professor Dan Kahan asserts that “federal criminal statutes should not uniformly be read either narrowly or broadly, but rather
appropriately so as to carry out their purposes and to realize the full range of benefits associated with delegated lawmaking.” Kahan, supra
note 15, at 426; see generally Jeffries, supra note 16, at 220–21 (identifying situations in which criminal laws should be interpreted narrowly).
48. See generally Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, supra note 10, at 896–930 (demonstrating that federal courts often expand the reach of
criminal laws in spite of strong grounds for interpreting them narrowly).
49. See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 534–35 (describing legislatures and prosecutors as “natural allies”).
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is no effective lobby for narrowing criminal statutes,” whereas “an overly narrow interpretation is
far more likely to be corrected…because prosecutors and other members of anti-criminal lobbying
groups are heavily involved in legislative drafting
and can more readily get on the legislative agenda.”50
Strict adherence to the rule of lenity would thus put
the burden of overcoming legislative inertia on the
shoulders of the party in the best position to persuade Congress to act.
Finally, a reinvigorated rule of lenity would promote the more effective operation of prosecutorial restraint. When courts stand ready to expand
ambiguous criminal laws to keep blameworthy
offenders from slipping through the cracks in federal criminal law, prosecutors can safely “push the
envelope” and stretch vague laws to their outer limit.
As long as they target blameworthy offenders—and,
disturbingly, even if they do not51—prosecutors can
be confident that courts will ratify their broad readings of criminal laws.
Lenity would dramatically change the calculus by lowering the prosecution’s likelihood of conviction, giving prosecutors greater incentives to
decline prosecution in cases of blameless or marginally blameworthy offenders potentially guilty
only of hypertechnical, victimless crimes—the kind
of offenders who tend to become ensnared in the

overcriminalization net. The administration of justice in federal prosecutions, therefore, would vastly
improve if federal courts started taking the rule of
lenity seriously.
Proportionality-Based Approaches to Statutory Construction. If federal judges remain fickle in their adherence to the rule of lenity despite
its obvious advantages, they should at least take
into account the potential sentencing consequences before expanding the reach of a criminal statute. This inquiry would require courts to look past
the facts of the cases before them, hypothesize the
range of potential applications of the statute,52 and
pay close attention to the penal consequences of
an expansive interpretation. In cases in which an
expansive interpretation would threaten to visit disproportionate punishment on convicted offenders,
as determined against the baseline of other criminal
laws (state or federal) proscribing the same criminal
act, a narrow reading is the appropriate response
unless the statute’s plain meaning commands a
broader interpretation.53
Proportionality considerations should also be
factored into mens rea selection. The Supreme Court
should repudiate the notion that avoiding conviction for morally blameless conduct is the only goal
of mens rea doctrine.54 A separate, equally vital and
proper concern of mens rea doctrine is to ensure that

50. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2162, 2194 (2002). One might wonder what the point of enforcing
lenity would be if Congress can be counted upon to repeal decisions narrowing the reach of criminal statutes. The fact, however, is that
Congress does not reflexively ride to the rescue of federal prosecutors handed interpretive defeats in court. According to a leading study of
congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions, Congress lets stand the vast majority (80 percent) of narrow interpretations of federal
criminal statutes. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 351 tbl. 19
(1991). This is cause for optimism about the potential for lenity to make serious inroads on overcriminalization.
51. Even though moral culpability is an essential prerequisite to punishment, judges (many of whom are themselves former prosecutors) may
tend to defer excessively to the judgment of prosecutors that an offender is blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment. Such misplaced
deference undoubtedly explains why the many sympathetic defendants whose stories have been cataloged by The Heritage Foundation and
the Criminal Law Reform Group were found guilty in spite of their blamelessness. See supra notes 1–2 & 5.
52. This hypothetical inquiry is exactly how the Supreme Court decides federal mens rea issues. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of
Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1023 (1999) (explaining that courts deciding such issues start by
asking “as a hypothetical matter whether morally blameless people could violate [the statute]”).
53. Pleas for proportionality of punishment inevitably encounter the objection that it is impossible to determine when, objectively speaking,
punishments are proportional. Although familiar, the objection is misplaced. Proportionality serves as a judicially manageable legal
standard in a variety of other contexts, such as determining the excessiveness of terms of imprisonment and of punitive-damages awards,
and proportionality is used by legislatures and judges alike in grading offenses and sentencing offenders. See Smith, Proportionality and
Federalization, supra note 10, at 891–92 (citing cases). Taking proportionality considerations into account is no more perilous in interpreting
federal crimes than in these other contexts, especially if the proportionality inquiry is grounded in a comparison with the penalties other laws
provide for a particular crime and is used only as an interpretive principle (as opposed to a standard of constitutionality).
54. In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), for example, the Court declared that mens rea doctrine “requires a court to read into a statute
only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’” Id. at 269.
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the sanctions available in the event of conviction
will be proportional to the blameworthiness of convicted offenders.55
Imposing punishment in excess of blameworthiness is just as offensive in principle as convicting
blameless conduct: Either way, courts are imposing
punishment that is not justified by the culpability of
the offender and gambling with the moral credibility of the criminal law. Crimes for which Congress
has prescribed severe penalties should require correspondingly high levels of mens rea so that offenders will be seriously blameworthy. Only then will
convicted offenders be morally deserving of the stiff
penalties that federal law affords.
Reinvigorate Mens Rea Requirements. Finally, courts should substantially overhaul federal mens
rea doctrine. Quite simply, the doctrine is in dire
need of reform both in its underlying theory and
in its operational details. For the stated purpose of
preventing punishment for morally blameless (or
“innocent”) conduct,56 the Supreme Court has made
“innocence protection” the driving force in mens rea
selection. Heightened mens rea requirements can
and should be imposed where (and only where) a
federal criminal statute would otherwise potentially reach morally blameless conduct.57
In addition to making disproportionate punishment a proper concern of mens rea doctrine, courts
should free the prevailing federal method of selecting mens rea from the shackles that prevent it from
achieving its important goal of aligning punishment
and blameworthiness. Once courts detect a poten-

tial innocence-protection problem—understood not
just as the potential for punishment of blameless
acts, but also as disproportionate punishment for
blameworthy acts—the courts should impose whatever heightened mens rea requirement is necessary to
limit punishment in accordance with blameworthiness. In doing so, courts should not be at all reluctant
to require, where necessary to avoid morally undeserved punishment, prosecutors to prove knowledge
that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal.
This more robust mens rea doctrine could be the
single most important contribution the courts could
make to avoiding the qualitative problems associated with overcriminalization. Overcriminalization horror stories typically involve prosecutors
using obscure regulatory laws as traps for unwary
citizens who are understandably unaware either
of the existence or the meaning of the law in question.58 To the extent that judges start demanding
proof in these cases, not only of the facts that make
the defendants’ conduct illegal, but also of the defendants’ knowledge that they were breaking the law,
prosecutors could no longer count on guilty pleas or
guilty verdicts.
The effect would not simply prevent unjust punishment, although that is a worthy goal in its own
right. It would also give the federal government
much-needed incentives either to give the regulated
public notice that such obscure crimes exist, thereby
enabling itself to prove knowing illegality, or, as one
scholar helpfully suggests,59 to use administrative or
civil enforcement mechanisms in place of criminal

55. For an extensive argument along this line, see Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26.
56. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000); see generally Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 131 (“The Supreme
Court has insisted that federal crimes be defined in terms that guarantee a path to acquittal for morally blameless conduct and has
increasingly looked to the mental element of crimes to provide this protection against punishment for ‘innocent’ conduct.”).
57. “Where the nature of the prohibited act, as defined by Congress, is sufficient to guarantee that anyone convicted of the crime will be morally
blameworthy, courts treat the legislative definition of the crime as conclusive and do not impose heightened mens rea requirements. If,
however, the prohibited act is not ‘inevitably nefarious’ and thus could potentially reach innocent conduct, courts adopt more stringent mens
rea requirements designed to exclude all innocent conduct from the crime’s reach.” Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, supra note 26, at 130. See,
e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2000); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510
U.S. 135 (1994).
58. For a collection of cases in which this has occurred, see, e.g., The Heritage Foundation, Legal Issues: Overcriminalization,
http://www.overcriminalized.com/CaseStudy.aspx (last visited May 28, 2014). The website does not mince words, describing the case
studies as “documented stories of good people whose lives were impacted by overcriminalization: criminal laws that are overbroad or flat-out
ridiculous, prosecutors and prosecutions that are over-zealous, and sentences that are harsh, unreasonable, and unjust. The lives of some
were shattered when they were arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned for doing things no one would think are crimes. Others did an act that
could be considered wrongful, but did so unintentionally—without ‘criminal intent’ (what lawyers call mens rea)—and should not have been
charged, convicted, or punished.” Id.
59. See Darryl Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 657, 677–82 (2011).
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prosecutions to achieve the government’s regulatory goals. In a free society, criminal prosecution—the
most coercive and stigmatizing exercise of governmental authority—should be a last resort, reserved
for cases in which the government’s legitimate regulatory goals cannot otherwise be achieved.

Conclusion

As this brief survey of federal criminal law has
shown, overcriminalization is a serious problem in
the federal system and more generally for American criminal law. The number and scope of criminal
laws, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. Ultimately, overcriminalization is so problematic because it
tends to degrade the quality of criminal codes and
result in unwarranted punishment, jeopardizing the
quality of justice the system generates. While overcriminalization is the order of the day in the federal
system, rendering the legislature no longer supreme
in matters of crime and punishment, it is ultimately
prosecutors who exploit incompletely defined crimes
and the redundancy of the criminal code to expand
the scope of their enforcement power and ratchet up
the punishment that convicted defendants face.


As judges decry this state of affairs and scholars
hope against hope for bold legislative or constitutional solutions, they have missed something critical. Given that the federal courts helped to make federal criminal law as broad and punitive as it is, there
is a ready solution to overcriminalization’s many
problems short of legislative self-restraint or judicial activism in the name of the Constitution.
The solution is for federal judges to approach their
vital interpretive functions with keen sensitivity to
the many adverse effects that overcriminalization
and the courts’ current, self-defeating interpretive
strategies create for federal criminal law. If courts
cease giving unwarranted scope to ambiguous criminal laws and redouble their efforts to use mens rea
requirements to rule out morally undeserved punishment—understood not merely as punishment for
blameless acts, but also as disproportionately severe
punishment for blameworthy acts—overcriminalization need not be the disaster that so many with
good cause believe it to be.
—Stephen F. Smith is Professor of Law at the
University of Notre Dame.
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